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Abstract 
Mobile tactical (military) networks have a number of concerns that distinguish them from 
commercial networks. Of primary concern is information security, achieved in part through 
message encryption using a common key. These networks are often wireless and ad hoc, 
that is they lack fixed infrastructure and communications are relayed in a multi-hop fashion. 
The mobility of the nodes leads to a highly dynamic and unpredictable network topology as 
well as a dynamic communication group membership. 
The focus of this thesis is on finding a secure and efficient solution to group key agreement 
in a tactical network. Existing group key establishment protocols were surveyed, but many 
were found inept in this setting. The best solution was the Arbitrary Topology Group Diffie 
Hellman (AT-GDH). However, this protocol has not been fully specified as no provisions 
were made for auxiliary key agreements. To complete the AT-GDH key agreement, 
additional protocols are presented to be performed upon group membership changes. Each 
protocol was evaluated in terms of efficiency and security. All agreements stemming from 
additions to the group membership were found to be highly efficient. However, the 




Modern tactical or military networks have a number of concerns that distinguish them from 
commercial networks. Information security has always been a primary concern, which has 
led to a reliance on encrypted communication. Another concern is survivability, that is the 
network's ability to perform to some degree after it has been damaged. Furthermore, these 
networks are to be deployed in a wide range of environments, some of which may be hostile. 
Finally, as army units are highly mobile, the network must be highly mobile as well. Because 
of these specific requirements, communication solutions designed for tactical use cannot 
simply be copies of their commercial counterparts. But it is desirable to make use of civilian 
technologies as much as possible for the sake of interoperability. 
In a typical tactical network scenario, HUMVEE's (military vehicles) form mobile base 
stations who communicate to each other through wireless or satellite links [LBPH 99]. These 
HUMVEE's then serve as a point of attachment for mobile ground soldiers carrying portable 
wireless communication devices. If soldiers are outside range of the HUMVEE, they may 
still communicate by relaying transmissions through other soldiers in a multi-hop fashion. 
The soldiers do this by forming what is termed an ad hoc network amongst themselves. 
Such a network is highly dynamic in terms of mobility and with nodes frequently joining and 
leaving. Similar types of ad hoc tactical networks may also be formed among a fleet of ships 
on the ocean or jets in the air. 
For the sake of security, there is a strong need for all wireless communications on the 
battlefield to be encrypted. This encryption is based upon a shared secret key known by all 
nodes in the communication group. The process of disseminating the key to all group 
members is known as group key establishment, and may or may not provide a mechanism 
for creating the key itself. 
1. 1 Problem Statement 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a secure group key establishment protocol suitable 
for use in a tactical environment. The nature of the tactical network is assumed to be multi-
hop, wireless, highly mobile, and lacking static infrastructures. Because of this non-
traditional nature, establishing a group key becomes more challenging than doing so in a 
wired, static network. 
' 
This thesis will contain a description of existing key establishment solutions, and a 
discussion of their shortcomings in the tactical environment. A key agreement protocol will 
be proposed by taking an existing initial key agreement protocol and extending it to include 
auxiliary agreements. These auxiliary agreements include any type of updation of the group 
key after the initial key has been agreed upon. The addition of the auxiliary agreement 
protocols should greatly improve the overall efficiency compared to generating a new key 
from scratch every time a key change is needed. Finally, the efficiency, security, and fault 
tolerance of the proposed protocol will be analyzed. 
The scope of this thesis is limited to the construction and dissemination of the group key. 
The method for keeping track of the group membership is not discussed. Nor are group 
membership management operations, such as admitting new members or removing them, 
discussed. However, an update of the group key may be triggered by a change in group 
membership. Additionally, it is assumed that the key establishment protocol is to be used in 
conjunction with some method of authentication. The particular method of authentication 
is not dwelled upon. Lastly, while a confidential routing protocol is desirable, it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that all links are two-way and symmetric. That is, all 
nodes can both transmit and receive messages, and that the radius of transmission is equal 
to the reception range. In addition, it is assumed that the physical spread of nodes is wider 
than their transmission ranges. Thus, the transmission of a single node may not 
immediately reach all members of the network. 
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1.2 Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows. We begin by introducing in Chapter 2 relevant 
background knowledge of tactical networks as well as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. 
Chapter 3 presents our design goals including security and efficiency aspirations. Chapter 4 
provides an overview of related work in the area of group key establishment. Chapter 5 
contains a description of our own auxiliary agreement protocols. These protocols are then 
analyzed in Chapter 6 in light of the design goals given in Chapter 3. Finally, conclusions are 
given and future directions are suggested in Chapter 7. 
2 Background 
In this chapter, several key concepts are outlined in order to facilitate an understanding of 
the nature of the tactical environment, the general mechanism of a key exchange, as well as 
the challenges involved. 
2. 1 Tactical Networks 
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Battlefield communication systems supporting command and control functions strongly rely 
on the use of wireless communication technology. However, unlike cellular networks, 
mobile tactical networks cannot rely on a fixed network infrastructure. This means there are 
no static routers, centralized servers, or fixed mobile support stations. The reason for a lack 
of infrastructure is threefold. First, fixed nodes and central servers are a vulnerable target 
for an enemy attack. Second, highly mobile military forces need a network that can travel 
with them. Third, the network needs to stay operative even if some nodes are destroyed or 
some links become disconnected [SEM99]. 
Because the multi-hop wireless model does not require a fixed infrastructure and readily 
adopts to change, it is a good choice of architecture for the dynamic tactical network. Of the 
types of multi-hop networks, ad hoc networking is the simplest. A mobile ad hoc network 
(MANET) is basically a self-organized system of peers where transmissions are routed 
through peer units to other units farther away. However, this type of network may not be 
entirely accurate for a network of foot soldiers, where most likely there will be mobile base 
stations with a broader transmission range than the soldier's hand held devices. Thus, 
transmissions are routed from base-station to base-station before finally arriving to the 
soldier. This type of network is termed a highly dynamic multi-hop wireless network 
(HDNet). But for the purpose of simplicity, this thesis will focus on the more basic ad hoc 
model. 
Due to the nature of the tactical network, there are more constraints than typically found in 
a traditional wired network. Connections are unstable and can be disconnected at any time. 
In fact, disconnections occur frequently and cannot be easily predicted. This is because 
nodes can wander outside of transmission range, run out of battery power, be destroyed by 
the enemy, or have their communication links jammed. In addition, the network topology 
can change rapidly as nodes move around, and thus cannot be assumed. Finally, the lack of 
any central servers imposes an additional challenge on communication protocols. 
2.2 Key Exchange Protocols 
This chapter provides an overview of the Diffie-Hellman protocol, then explains the 
difference between different types of key exchanges. 
2.2.1 Two party Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
The key agreement solution described in this thesis is based upon the Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange [DH76]. This is a way for two entities to create a shared symmetric key without 
using a key server. The protocol steps are outlined in Figure 2.1. 
1. The parties A and B agree on a cyclic group of order p denoted Zp, where pis prime, 
and a generator afor the group. The values panda are publicly known. 
2. A chooses eA at random, computes ae A and sends it to B 
3. B chooses e8 at random, computes ae8 and sends it to A 
4. A computes K = (ae8 YA 
B computes K = (aeA YB 
Figure 2.1: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
The Diffie-Hellman protocol was chosen as a building block for several reasons. First of all, 
it does not require the use of a third party nor do the two entities need to have a previously 
shared common secret. Second, the simplicity of the operations is an attractive feature. In 
addition, the protocol is resistant to passive eavesdropping attacks. Furthermore, since it 
has been around since 1976, it has been well scrutinized. However, the lack of 
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authentication between the two parties is a major weakness. Thus, unless a layer of 
authentication is added on, it can fall prey to the man-in-the-middle attack. 
2.2.2 Initial and auxiliary exchanges 
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When a communication group is first formed, an initial key agreement (IKA) is executed in 
order to provide all members of the group with the encryption key for subsequent 
communications. Eventually, a member may need to be excluded from the group or a new 
member may want to join. Furthermore, entire subgroups may need to be excluded at a time 
or two groups may want to merge. In fact, these membership changes would occur 
frequently in an ad hoc environment due to frequent disconnections and network 
partitioning. In order to preserve key independence, the group key must be refreshed after 
every one of these membership change. 
Executing the initial key agreement for every membership change is inefficient as many 
redundant operations are performed. Thus, it is beneficial to have separate key agreement 
protocols for each of the single member join, mass join, group fusion, single member leave, 
and mass leave events. These protocols are collectively termed auxiliary key agreement 
(AKA) protocols. Auxiliary key agreement will be the focus of this thesis. 
2.2.3 Key distribution versus key agreement 
The methods of group key establishment fall under two main categories, key distribution 
and key agreement. Under a distributory protocol, the group key is chosen by a single party 
and is then passed throughout the group. The emphasis here is on preventing a third party 
eavesdropper from acquiring the key while it is being distributed. Thus, some type of secure 
channel is usually needed to keep the key confidential. Since there are no stipulations about 
the structure of the group key, a problem might arise if the key is chosen unwisely. 
In contrast, under a key agreement protocol every member of the group contributes equally 
towards the key generation. Thus it is also known as contributory key establishment. The 
participants each generate a secret share and a corresponding public share. They can then 
construct the group key by combining their secret share with everyone else's public shares. 
It is impossible to construct the key without knowing at least one secret share. Since the 
secret shares are never disclosed, secure channels are not needed. Additionally, each 
participant is guaranteed that the group key is fresh. However, this type of protocol may be 
more time consuming since the individual shares need to be given to everyone. It may also 
require greater computation power as each participant must compute the group key. The 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange is one example of a contributory protocol. 
2.3 Layering Authentication 
Since the key exchange protocol itself is not concerned with who the messages originate 
from, it is necessary to include an authentication layer in order to prevent impersonation. 
This can be achieved by controlling admissions to the group and performing a group 
membership verification before every key exchange. Agarwal, et al suggest the use of a 
"secure group layer" to be interposed between the group communication system and the 
application [ACTT01]. This layer handles both key agreement and access control. The 
method of authentication, however, remains as yet an open research topic. 
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One method for incorporating authentication into group membership management is known 
as certificate chaining [MAHoo ], and is designed to operate in the absence of a certification 
authority (CA). Under this system, nodes cannot be admitted into the group unless they 
possess a signed certificate. These certificates are issued by a select group of members, 
known as leaders, who sign the certificate with their own key. The certificate itself contains 
four items: the identity of the leader, the member's public key, the expiration date, and the 
leader's signature. The new member can then be considered legitimate by verifying the 
signature with the leader's public key. Leaders can also instate other leaders in a similar 
manner, with a separate leadership certificate. 
Unfortunately, under this system it is not easy to cancel membership once it is granted. To 
immediately revoke a member from the group, their identity must be distributed throughout 
the network. This message may take time to reach all members in a highly volatile ad hoc 
network, leading to the possibility of the revoked member being accepted as valid. 
Alternatively, membership can be controlled by choosing a short expiration date for 
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certificates. Then a member may be revoked by simply not renewing their certificate. The 
drawback is that leaders must frequently refresh certificates for valid members. Note that if 
a leader is revoked, all members certified by that leader can no longer be considered valid. 
3 Design Goals 
This chapter describes the criteria that the key exchange protocol should aspire to meet. 
3. 1 Environmental Constraints 
Environmental constraints of a tactical network include: 
• No fixed routing infrastructure exists, including static routers and central servers. 
• Nodes are highly mobile, thus no assumptions can be made about the network 
topology. 
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• Natural obstructions to wireless signals may exist, leading to frequent disconnections 
and reconnections. 
• Transmission ranges are limited. 
• Because it is a military network, the environment may be very hostile. 
3.2 Security Goals 
Because the environment may be hostile, special emphasis must be placed upon ensuring 
the security of the key exchange. These security goals are listed and described below. 
Group Key Secrecy An outsider should find it computationally infeasible to compute the 
group key. 
Backward and Forward Secrecy Knowledge of the current key should provide no 
clues in computing old key(s). Similarly, knowledge of old key(s) should provide no clues in 
computing future key(s). In addition, to prevent excluded members from computing the 
new group key, this new key should not be distributed using the old group key. 
Furthermore, newly admitted group members should not have knowledge of any previous 
group key(s) in use before they joined. 
Attack Resistance The protocol should be resistant to active and passive eavesdropping. 
A passive eavesdropper tries to deduce all or part of the group key by listening to traffic on 
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the network. An active eavesdropper not only listens but may also attempt to impersonate a 
group member, alter messages, or resend old messages. The goal of this type of adversary is 
to either fool participants into believing they have exchanged a key when they have not, or to 
cause participants to accept a false key as valid [Sti95]. Furthermore, the protocol should 
ideally be resistant to denial of service attacks. 
Freshness When the group key is updated, it should always be replaced by a fresh key. 
That is, the new key should be independent of any previous keys, and previous keys should 
never be reused. This is important to prevent replay attacks and known key attacks. 
Key Authentication The group key should only be available to valid group members. 
Outsiders can only learn of the key through the help of a dishonest participant. 
3.3 Efficiency Goals 
The protocol should strive to be as simple and efficient as possible, ideally completing before 
the network becomes disconnected or the topology changes drastically. However, if a 
node(s) does become disconnected, the protocol should not fail. In addition, any auxiliary 
exchanges should be at least at efficient as the initial key exchange. In this thesis, efficiency 
shall be defined in terms of the number of rounds necessary, the number of messages to be 
sent, the complexity of computations performed at each node, and the total computations 
performed. 
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4 Key Establishment Implementations 
Much research has been done on securing mobile ad hoc wireless networks, one aspect of 
which is the encryption of transmissions. Zhou and Haas [ZH99] have proposed a method 
of securing ad hoc networks through the use of digital signatures and public key encryption. 
However, this method relies on a subset of nodes to be key servers, and so it is not self-
sufficient. Srdjan Capkun, et al [CBH03] have improved the method to be independent of 
any trusted authority or fixed server and so is more suitable for a peer based network. 
Unfortunately, neither solution appears appropriate for large scale group communication, 
which is better achieved through a single symmetric group key rather than multiple public 
keys. 
To facilitate key distribution within a group, several protocols have been proposed. They are 
of two main categories, key agreement and key distribution, the differences of which were 
explained in Chapter 2. Most of these protocols were not designed specifically for ad hoc 
networks, but may be extended to operate in such an environment. 
4. 1 Distributory Key Exchange Protocols 
One key distribution protocol, labeled the centralized key graph protocol [W98], involves a 
binary tree in which the leaves are the group members, and the nodes are the keys. At the 
root of the tree is the key server, which constructs the key tree, generates the group key, and 
distributes the keys to each member via secure channels of communication. These secure 
channels can be set up, for example, through public key encryption. The intermediate nodes 
in the tree are intermediate keys, which are also distributed by the key server. Each member 
knows all keys in their key-path. Thus, if there are eight members in the group, each 
member knows four keys, including the group key, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
1:2 
Figure 4.1: Tree structure for a group of 8 members (RBDoo) 
Another distributory protocol, labeled optimized rekey [RBDoo], refines the centralized key 
graph method by eliminating the central key server. Instead, one member is chosen as the 
group leader, who then constructs the key tree. The key tree is similar to the one shown in 
Figure 4.1 with all members being leaves of the tree, and the group leader as the left-most 
leaf. The difference is that the root node is no longer the key server, instead it simply 
represents the group key. 
Referring to Figure 4.1, the protocol works by successively splitting the group into 
subgroups, until each subgroup contains only two members. At this point, the left-most 
member (m1) generates the first mutual key (k12) and sends it to the other member (mz) via a 
secure channel. Members m3 , ms, and m7 do the same. In the next round, member m1 
generates the second-level key (k14) and sends it to member m3 via a secure channel. 
Member m1 then encrypts k14 using k12 and multicasts it to mz. Member m3 also encrypts k14 
using k34 and multicasts it to m4 • This same process is initiated by member ms. In the final 
round, the group leader (m1) generates the group key (k1s) and sends it to the leader of the 
right-hand branch (m5). The group leader also encrypts the group key using k14 and 
multicasts the group key to all members of the left-hand branch. The leader of the right-
hand subtree (ms) also encrypts the group key using k5s and multicasts it to all members of 
the right-hand subtree. 
So in an eight-membered group, the protocol completes in three rounds and requires seven 
secure two-party channels. In general, a group consisting of N members will require log2N 
rounds and N-1 secure channels. 
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As a candidate for a key exchange solution in the tactical environment, this protocol has 
many problems. The most difficult is the creation of the key tree in a situation where 
member's individual transmission ranges are smaller than the overall spread of the group. 
Thus, it would be difficult to set up a secure channel between two members who are outside 
of transmission range of each other. Even if these secure channels are possible, they are 
expensive to set up and maintain as the creation of each channel requires a separate two-
party key exchange. Secondly, this protocol relies on multicast communication to distribute 
the encrypted key. In a wireless tactical environment, this would translate to broadcasting 
the encrypted key. Again, this could be inefficient if some members lie outside the 
immediate broadcast range. 
Also, this protocol has a disadvantage due to its distributory nature. The generation of the 
group key by a single member without any one else contributing to it may lead to security 
issues. For example, that member may choose a previously used key or an inappropriate key 
which can be guessed by an outsider. There is no guarantee of a fresh key. For this reason, a 
contributory protocol becomes more appealing. 
4.2 Contributory Key Exchange Protocols 
One of the simplest two-party contributory key exchange methods is the Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange. Many solutions for extending the Diffie-Hellman key exchange into a multi-party 
key agreement have been proposed. The first was done by Ingemarsson et al. [I1W82], in 
which group members are arranged in a logical ring with each participant adding its 
exponent to the key before forwarding it to the next participant. Unfortunately, this protocol 
is unpractical because forming a ring can be difficult in a wireless ad hoc network with 
limited transmission range. In addition, the symmetry of the protocol inhibits efficient 
auxiliary key agreements. Furthermore, the protocol can fall prey to passive eavesdropping 
attacks. 
Other existing Diffie-Hellman based key agreement protocols include the Burmester and 
Desmedt protocol [BD94], the Hypercube protocol [BW98], the Octopus protocol [BW98], 
and the protocol termed GDH.2 also known as the CLIQUES protocol suite [S1W96, 
14 
STW98, STWoo]. All of these protocols have been found to be lacking in an ad hoc 
environment [Ho1]. This is due to either an imposition on network topology, such as the 
formation of a hypercube, or a reliance on global broadcasts. When comparing the 
performance of the initial key agreements between these four protocols, the GDH.2 protocol 
required the least number of both messages and exponential operations [AD02]. In 
addition, it is resistant to passive eavesdroppers and lays out both the initial key agreement 
and auxiliary key agreement algorithms. For this reason, the protocol steps are outlined in 
detail in Section 4.2.1. 
An improvement upon GDH.2 is the protocol termed Tree Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH), 
which improves efficiency by utilizing a tree structure instead of a linear chain. This 
protocol is outlined in section 4.2.3. The final protocol discussed in this chapter is the 
Arbitrary Topology GDH (AT-GDH) protocol. Out of all existing protocols surveyed, it was 
the only one designed specifically for an ad hoc network. The protocol, which is performed 
over a spanning tree, is discussed in section 4.2-4. 
4.2.1 The CLIQUES protocol suite 
The initial key agreement protocol, termed GDH.2, was introduced by Steiner at al. in 
[STW96] then later extended to include auxiliary agreements in [STW98] and [STWoo]. 
Collectively, the protocols are termed CLIQUES. The CLIQUES protocols are geared 
towards key agreement in dynamic peer groups, which are generally small-scale groups that 
utilize a many-to-many communication pattern. Although this approach is not the most 
efficient nor the best suited for an ad hoc network, it does provide a good starting point as 
well as a model for auxiliary agreement operations. 
The CLIQUES protocols are contributory in nature, meaning each member contributes a 
share of the key. That share is kept secret, even from other group members. Anyone who 
has contributed a share can calculate the key, and the key cannot be extracted without 
knowing at least one of the shares. 
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Initial Key Agreement (IKA) 
The initial key agreement protocol is designed to be executed at the time of group formation. 
It is assumed that at this time group members do not share any common secrets with each 
other. The key shares are pieced together in a linear fashion, with the final member 
broadcasting the intermediate key pieces to all members. The IKA protocol steps are 
outlined in Figure 4.2. 
Initialization: Let n be the size of the group. Let ZP be a cyclic group of order q, where p 
and q are prime, and q is a divisor of p - 1. Let a be a generator for the group. Let M; be 
the ith member. 
Stage 1 (Upflow): Round i (0:::; i:::; n) 
1. M; receives a sequence of (i-1) intermediate key pieces and a cardinal value from 
2. M; generates a random secret share N; E 
3. M; computes the new cardinal value a; = (ai-1 t;. The old cardinal value 
becomes one of the intermediate key pieces. 
4. M; raises the old intermediate key pieces to the power of N; 
5. M; sends the new cardinal value as well as the new intermediate key pieces to Mi+1 
Stage 2 (Broadcast): Round n 
l. Mn generates a random secret share Nn E Zq and computes the intermediate key 
pieces. 
2. Mn broadcasts the (n-1) key pieces to the entire group. 
The final group key is aN1 .Nn 
Figure 4.2: CLIQUES IKA protocol 
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Note that this IKA protocol requires every Mi to perform a total of (i + 1) exponentiations. 
In order to prevent the computations from increasing as the group size grows, a second IKA 
protocol has been proposed in [STWoo] which utilizes a constant number of 
exponentiations for each Mi and constant message sizes. This is accomplished by splitting 
the protocol into four stages, including two broadcast stages. For further details of this 
protocol, dubbed IKA.2, refer to [STWoo]. 
Auxiliary Key Agreements (AKA) 
The auxiliary key agreements are designed to be executed whenever the group membership 
changes, thereby causing a need for a fresh key. The auxiliary protocols build upon the 
partial keys broadcast in stage 2 of IKA, thus any member with knowledge of the partial keys 
can initiate an AKA. This initiator is termed the group controller, denoted by Mc. The types 
of AKA's are: member addition, member exclusion, mass join, subgroup exclusion, group 
fusion, and key refresh. 
In the member addition protocol, the group controller modifies its secret share in order to 
prevent the new member from learning the old group key. It then sends an upflow message 
to the new member containing the intermediate key pieces. Once the new member receives 
the message from the group controller, it adds its own secret share to it and broadcasts the 
new key pieces to all members of the group. This protocol is outlined in Figure 4.3. 
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Stage 1 (Upflow): round l 
A A 
1. Mc generates a new exponent Ne and changes its secret share from Ne to NcN,, 
then computes the new key pieces. 
2. Mc sends the intermediate key pieces and the cardinal value to the new member. 
Stage 2 (Broadcast): round 2 
1. The new member generates a new secret share Nn+I and computes the key pieces. 
2. The new member broadcasts the key pieces to all members of the group 
Mn+1 ➔ ALLM;: a C p lkE [1,n+l] 
{ 
N n( N lpe[l,n+l)Ap#) } 
Figure 4.3: CLIQUES Member Addition 
A slightly different protocol was designed by Steiner at al. to handle mass group additions, 
Figure 4.4. This is preferable to repeatedly running the single member addition operation as 
only one broadcast is performed instead of a separate broadcast for each new member. 
Initialization: Let m be the number of new group members. 
~ ~ 
I. Mc generates a new exponent Ne and changes its secret share from N, to N,M , 
then computes the new key pieces 
2. M, sends the intermediate key pieces and the cardinal value to the first new 
member. 
Stage 1 (Upflow): round i (1 :s; i :s; m) 
1. The ith new member generates a secret exponent Nn+i and computes the new key 
pieces 
2. The ith new member sends the intermediate key pieces and the cardinal value to 
the next new member . 
Mn + ; ➔Mn + ; + 1 • a I k E [1, n + z] , a • { N en( N plpe[l,n+i]Ap;<k) . } N en( N Pjpe[l,n+i!) 
Stage 2 (Broadcast): round m+ I 
1. The final new member generates a new secret share Nn+m and computes the key 
pieces. 
2. The final new member broadcasts the key pieces to all members of the group 
Mn+m ➔ ALLM;: a C p jkE [l,n+m] 
{ 
N n( N jpe[I,n+m]Ap;<k) } 
Figure 4.4: CLIQUES Mass Join 
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Another membership change event occurs when two distinct groups merge into a single 
group; this is referred to as group fusion. One approach to group fusion is based on a 
technique developed by Steer at al. in [BW98]. Under this approach, the group controller 
from each group exchanges their key residues: aK1 and aK2 respectively, and computes the 
new group key K 12 = aK1 Kz • They then broadcast the new key pieces to all members in the 
group. If there arises a need to revert back to the two original groups, group fission, the two 
groups simply use their original keys (K1 and K2) again. 
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The third auxiliary operation is member exclusion, Figure 4.5. In this case it is necessary to 
change at least one remaining member's share to prevent the excluded member from 
obtaining the new key. In this solution, it is the sponsor who changes its secret share. 
Initialization: Mc generates a new exponent Ne and changes its secret share from Ne to 
NcNc , then computes the new key pieces. 
Stage 1 (Broadcast): round 1 
The group controller broadcasts the new key pieces to all members of the group except 
the recently excluded member, d. 
Mc ➔ ALL M; : a p I k E [1, n] " k -::f- d { 
n(N IJJE[l,n]Ap#) } 
Figure 4.5: CLIQUES Member Exclusion 
The authors extend the member exclusion protocol to handle the removal of subgroups by a 
simple modification to the broadcast message. Only the key pieces correlating to the 
remaining members are distributed. 
The final auxiliary protocol describes the steps to refresh the group key, Figure 4.6. Unlike 
the other protocols, this one does not result from a membership change event, but should be 
performed periodically for greater security. 
Initialization: Let Mh represent the member initiating the key-refresh. This member 
changes its secret exponent from Nh to NcNc and computes the new key pieces. 
Stage 1 (Broadcast): round 1 
The initiator broadcasts the key pieces to all members of the group 
Mh ➔ ALL M; : a P I k E [1, n] 
{ 
Nhn(N IJJE[l,n]Ap#) } 
Figure 4.6: CLIQUES Key Refresh 
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4.2.2 Application of CLIQUES in wireless ad hoc networks 
The CLIQUES protocols are an improvement over the Ingemarsson et al. and Burmester and 
Desmedt protocols because fewer exponential operations are needed. However, there arise 
three main issues with respect to the wireless ad hoc environment. First, the global 
broadcast performed in the last step of each protocol may not be feasible in a network where 
some members lie outside the transmission range of member Mn. Second, the linearity of 
the steps can lead to problems in an environment where frequentdisconnections are 
inevitable. For example, if a member node goes offline before it has a chance to send the key 
pieces to the next member in the sequence, then the protocol cannot complete until that 
node resumes connectivity. Third, the protocol does not provide a method for determining 
the sequence of the linear chain. Such a sequence cannot be predetermined, as nodes are 
highly mobile, and so must be somehow integrated into the protocol. 
Anton and Duarte have proposed a method for group key establishment in wireless ad hoc 
networks by solving the problem of sequence establishment [AD02]. This is done through a 
group member discovery protocol to be used during the execution of the CLIQUES 
protocols. When a node is ready to send the key pieces to the next node in the chain, it 
searches for nearby group members through the use of flooding messages. Every node that 
receives the flooding message and that has not yet participated sends a reply message. The 
searching node then picks one to be the next node in the sequence. If no reply messages are 
received, the node assumes it is the last in the chain and performs the final step of the group 
key establishment. 
While Anton and Duarte's solution may be viable in the ad hoc environment, it still does not 
solve the issues related to the linearity of the sequence or the global broadcasts. 
4.2.3 Tree Group Diffie Hellman 
Another group key agreement protocol proposed by Kim, Perrig, and Tsudik is known as tree 
group Diffie Hellman (TGDH) [KPToo], [KTP02]. This protocol is based on the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange and makes use of binary key trees for efficient key computation. The 
key tree has the same structure as the tree in the optimized rekey protocol (Figure 4.1), with 
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the leaves of the tree representing group members' session keys, the root node representing 
the group key, and intermediate nodes representing intermediate keys. The authors use the 
notation <l,v> to denote each node in the tree, meaning the v-th node at level of depth l. A 






Figure 4.7: TGDH tree with notation (KPToo) 
Each node is associated with both a key and a blinded key. The blinded key is computed 
using a modular exponentiation equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman protocol. Every member 
knows every key in its key-path from itself to the root, as well as the blinded keys of every 
node in the tree. The group key is computed recursively starting with the highest level and 
working up to the root. Each key is computed individually from the blinded key of the right 
child raised to the exponent of the key of the left child as follows: 
K (1,v) = (BK (1+1,2v+1) t(l+l,Zv} mod p 
Or alternatively, the key can be computed from the blinded key of the left child raised to the 
exponent of the key of the right child. The blinded key itself is calculated as follows: 
BK(1,v) = a K(l,v) mod p 
Thus, any member can compute the group key K<o,o> from that member's secret share and 
from the keys in each members key-path, which are in turn derived from the blinded keys of 
the siblings of each node in the key-path. This set of blinded keys is termed by the authors 
the co-path. Additionally, the authors note that the group secret K<o,o> is not the final group 
key. Instead, a hash function h(K<o,o>) is used for the purposes of authentication, encryption, 
and integrity. For the purposes of authentication, all protocol messages are signed by the 
sender. 
The authors also provide the mechanisms for updating the group key upon a membership 
change event. These events include join, leave, merge, partition, and key refresh. In each 
case, the protocol is initiated by a member termed the sponsor. 
Y) 
Under the join protocol, the key-tree is modified to include a leaf representing the new 
member. This leaf is added in such a way as to minimize the height of the tree. The sponsor 
member collects the new member's blinded key and uses it along with every current 
members' blinded keys to compute the new group key. The sponsor then broadcasts the new 
tree as well as all blinded keys. Once the current members receive the new tree structure as 
well as the blinded keys, they can compute the new group key. 
When a member leaves the group, the sponsor deletes the corresponding leaf from the tree, 
then restructures the tree to minimize its height. The sponsor member then changes its own 
secret share, thereby changing its blinded key, and computes the new group key. Finally, the 
new tree structure and set of blinded keys are broadcast to all group members. 
The key refresh protocol is a special case of the leave protocol, but without the deletion of 
any nodes. Instead, the sponsor member simply changes its secret share. 
If it becomes necessary to partition the group or remove multiple members at once, those 
leaving members are first deleted from the tree. Each leaving member is associated with a 
non-leaving sponsor. The right-most sponsor changes its secret share. Then each sponsor 
broadcasts the set of blinded keys on its key-path. 
Due to network faults, separate subgroups can form which may need to be merged once the 
network heals. In this case, a sponsor from each tree broadcasts its tree structure along with 
all blinded keys to the other group. Assuming there are only two merging groups, the 
shallower tree is joined to the deeper tree. A third sponsor is chosen who then broadcasts 
the new key structure and all blinded keys. At this point all members can now compute the 
new group key. 
This protocol has a major advantage over GDH.2 of the Cliques suite as the tree structure 
leads to more efficient key computation. More specifically, the number of exponentiations 
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required for member addition under TGDH is O(log2n) compared with O(n) for GDH.2. 
However, it still relies on global broadcast messages. Furthermore, the basic tree structure 
is preserved throughout all key updates. This not only does not take into account member 
movements, which occur frequently in a highly mobile tactical network, but it also means 
that any sponsor needs to keep track of the tree structure. 
4.2.4 AT-GDH Protocol: Initial Key Agreement 
Solving the problem of the global broadcasting issues, another protocol, based on the 
construction of spanning trees, was proposed by Hietalahti in [Hieo1]. The author calls this 
protocol AT-GDH, for arbitrary topology group Diffie-Hellman. This protocol was designed 
specifically for use in mobile ad hoc wireless networks, where connections may be 
unreliable, broadcast range is limited, and nothing can be assumed about the topology of the 
connection graph. Thus it is the most appealing choice for use in a tactical environment out 
of all of the existing solutions. 
Similar to TGDH, AT-GDH also uses a hierarchical tree structure for computing the group 
key, with the root node representing the group key. However, this tree is not necessarily 
binary, and instead of only the leaves representing group members, every node in the tree 
represents a member of the group. Since the tree is a subgraph of the connectivity matrix, 
and since the set of vertices equals the set of group members, it is termed a spanning tree. 
The author provides one possible method for constructing the spanning tree, assuming that 
the nodes are aware of their neighbors. It begins with the initiator sending a message to 
each of its neighbors. Once the neighbors get the message, they send back an 
acknowledgement. At this point, the initiator becomes the root of the tree and each 
neighbor becomes a child of the root. They then send a message to their neighbors, until 
every node is part of the tree. If a node receives more than one message, it only 
acknowledges the first and ignores the others. However, if the network is extremely 
unreliable it may be necessary to send a negative acknowledgement instead of merely 
ignoring the message. A node assumes that it must be a leaf in the tree if it does not receive 
any acknowledgements at all. Note that the nodes are not aware of the entire tree structure, 
they only know of their parent and children (if any). 
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A sample network connectivity matrix along with a possible corresponding spanning tree is 




Figure 4.8: Network connectivity matrix and corresponding spanning tree 
Once the spanning tree has formed, the initial key agreement can begin. The protocol begins 
with the leaves of the tree and culminates with the final group key at the root node. The root 
node then passes the key pieces down to its children, which pass them to their children, until 
everyone has the necessary information to construct the group key. Thus, every node sends 
one message and receives one message. Since a node may have more than one child, it first 
forms a Diffie-Hellman key with its left-most child. Then it uses this new key and forms 
another Diffie-Hellman key with the second child. The process continues for all remaining 
children. The key formed with the last child serves as the exponent to be passed to the 
parent. In the second stage, the root sends a message to its children containing the public 
keys of the right-hand siblings and the recursive exponentiations of the left-hand siblings. 
This propagates down to the leaves. The protocol steps are given in Figure 4.9. 
The tree structure of AT-GDH makes it more efficient than the linear-based GDH.2 of the 
Cliques suite, as there are less exponentiations performed at each node and less rounds. AT-
GDH requires O(logkn) exponentiations and the same number of simple rounds, compared 
to O(n) exponentiatons and rounds of GDH.2. 
While TGDH is of a comparable efficiency to AT-GDH (O(log2n) compared to O(logkn)), AT-
GDH has other advantages over it. As mentioned earlier, AT-GDH does not require a global 
broadcast to disseminate the key. In addition, nodes in the spanning tree of AT-GDH are at 
most one hop away from each other in the ad hoc network. This is not necessarily the case 
for the binary tree of TGDH. Thirdly, the entire tree structure does not have to be 
propagated throughout the group, as it is sufficient to simply know the immediate parent 
and children nodes. 
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One drawback of the AT-GDH protocol is the reliance on a bijection, termed <p, from a cyclic 
group G to the set of integers modulo q. This is the same bijection used in the Hypercube 
and Octopus protocols, both of which were presented by Becker and Wille. The need for this 
bijection stems from the use of a Diffie-Hellman key (which is an element of G) to be used as 
an input in the next round. If alpha is chosen to be the primitive element modulo p, in other 
words if G = Zq * then a solution for <pis simple. But otherwise, a practical solution for <p has 
yet to be found. Becker and Wille themselves acknowledge this problem in [BW98]. 
Initialization: Let G be a cyclic group of order q with generator a. Let h represent the 
height of the spanning tree. Assume there exists a bijection rp: G ➔ £q 
Stage 1: 
Round 1 
1. All leaves of the tree select a random secret share kx E Lq 
2. The leaves send the blinded share to their parents 
Rounds 2 .. h: For all nodes x that have children: 
1. Node x selects a random secret exponent ex E G 
k . 
2. Node x waits for the blinded shares a x.J from all of its children 
3. Node x calculates kx = rp ( K (x, c x)) from 
K(x,0) = ex 
4. 
Stage 2: 
. kx .q,(K(x.j-1)) . 
K(x,1)=a .] forl:5J:5Cx 
k 
x ➔ y:ax 
Round h + 1 
1. The root node, E, sends a message to each of its children containing the key 
pieces 
£ ➔ x.i: Mx.i = (-, aq,(K(x,i-1)) ,a kx.(i+I) ,a kx.(i+2), akx.cx)) 
Rounds h + l where 2 :5 l :5 h 
1. Node x sends a message to each of its children containing the key pieces 
X ➔ x.i: Mx.i = ( Mx,aq,(K(x,i-1)) ,akx.(i+I) ,akx.(i+2) ,akx.cx)) 
The final group key is k£ = K( E, cf) 
Figure 4.9: Spanning Tree IKA 
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5 Auxiliary Key Agreements for AT-GDH 
Comparison of the group key exchange protocols given in Chapter 4 shows the AT-GDH 
protocol to be best suited for use in a dynamic wireless ad hoc environment. However, the 
initial key agreement protocol described in [Hieo1] forms only part of a key establishment 
system. Once a key has been in use for some time, it is likely that the communication group 
will want to change to a new key. Reasons for refreshing the key could include the current 
key being compromised or a change in group membership. Changes to group membership, 
such as additions and exclusions, occur quite frequently in practice, especially in an ad hoc 
environment where there are frequent disconnections and network partitioning. Although it 
would suffice to re-execute the initial key agreement protocol every time the key needs 
refreshed, more efficient alternatives are desirable. These alternatives are collectively 
termed auxiliary key agreements. 
In this chapter, several different auxiliary key agreement algorithms are described. The 
algorithms are join, mass join, merge, leave, and refresh. Each has been derived through 
modification of the initial algorithm. The result in all cases is a completely new group 
encryption key. 
5. 1 Join Protocols 
There are three different ways a communication group can be expanded: the addition of a 
single member, the addition of multiple members, or the addition of an existing group. Each 
case requires a slightly different key agreement algorithm. These algorithms are described 
below. 
5.1.1 Single member join 
In the case of a single member being added to the group, two things are required. The first 
requirement is that a new group encryption key needs to be formed from contributions of all 
members including the newly joined member. The second is that this key needs to be 
securely propagated throughout the group. 
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These requirements can be achieved through a simplification of the initial key agreement 
algorithm. In this new algorithm, the joining member chooses its own secret share, call it ei. 
Then the new key is simply (a 01d key )"1 . To compute this new key, the new member needs to 
know a(oldkey) and all original members need to know ae1 • Thus the secrecy of the old key is 
not disclosed to the new member. Furthermore, it is resistant to passive eavesdropping 
since the knowledge of both a(oldkey) and ae1 does not imply knowledge of the old key, ei, or 
the new key formed. 
The single member join algorithm is given in Figure 5.1 below. 
Phase 1, Round 1 
1. Sponsor, a, agrees to add new member, j, to the group. 
2. New member, j, chooses a secret key, e i, and sends the blinded version to the 
sponsor. 
3. a ➔ j: (iP(o/d key) 
Phase 2 
Round 2: The sponsor sends the new member's share to all nodes within 
range. 
,p(e-) 
a ➔ Ca: a 1 
Rounds 3 to 3+/, l = I, .. . ,h: For every node x on level l, 
X ➔ Cx: a~ej) 
The resulting group key is: 
key= a"l...eJ = (a,p(oldkey) th) 
( 
,J )J,p(oldkey) 
Figure 5.1: Single member join 
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5.1.2 Mass join 
A mass join event occurs when multiple new members are admitted into an existing group 
simultaneously. In this case, a new group key must be agreed upon and issued to each new 
and existing member. 
This can be done using a strategy similar to the star topology based protocol given in 
[SSDW88]. All new members are admitted through the aid of a single sponsor member, who 
forms the center of the star. This sponsor collects the contributions ( a'k ) of each new 
member, compiles them together, then computes the new group key. The sponsor then 
distributes the new members' contributions throughout the group allowing all previously 
existing members to compute the new group key. Finally, for the new members to compute 
the group key, they need to know a(oldkey) as well as the contributions of their fellow new 
members. Note that for this protocol to work effectively, all joining members should be 
within transmission range of the sponsor member. 
For example, if three new members are added, the sponsor would collect the following 
shares: 
New member 1 ➔ sponsor: 
New member 2 ➔ sponsor: 
New member 3 ➔ sponsor: 
Next, the sponsor would compute the group key as follows: 
Sponsor selects a random e5 
contributions= ak3ak 1ak,e, = ak3 /\ (ak2 /\ (akles )) 
new group key= (contributions )l°1dkey) 
Once each existing member receives the compiled new member's contributions from the 
sponsor, they can also compute the new group key. Finally, the sponsor sends the following 
key pieces to the new members, allowing them to compute the group key: 
Sponsor ➔ new member 1: (a(oldkey),ae, ,ak1 ,ak') 
Sponsor ➔ new member 2: \ a(oldkey) .~,e, ,ak') 
Sponsor ➔ newmember3: (a(old key ),ak'" (ak,e, )) 
Sponsor ➔ existing members: a(contributions) 
Each new member would compute the group key as follows: 
New member 1 computes: key= a(oldkn)/\ (ak' I\ (ak' I\ (ml )' 1 )) where n~ = ae, 
New member 2 computes: key= a(oldke.v)/\(ak3 /\(m2f) where m 2 = akie, 
New member 3 computes key = a(old key)/\ (1113 y3 where 1113 = ak' I\ (akie, ) 
Each existing member would compute the group key as follows: 
key= (mx yoldkey) where mx = a(contributions) 
The mass join algorithm is given in Figure 5.2 below. 
Round1 
l. Sponsor, s, agrees to add n new members to the group. 
2. s selects a random es E G 
3. Each new member,j, chooses a secret key (kj), and sends their contribution 
to s. 
Round 2 
For j in (l..n): 
k-
j ➔ s :a 1 
k-
l. s waits to receive a 1 for allj = l, .. ,n 
2. s calculates contributions= (f)(K(n)) from 
K(O) = es 
( 
k )q,(K (j-1)) 
K(j) = a 1 for j = l, ... ,n 
3. s ➔ j : M 
1
, where 
M _ = (arp(oldkey) atp(K(j-1)) akJ+I ak") 1 ' , ' .•• ' 
4. s ➔ x : a(contributions) where x are all existing members 
The resulting group key is: a(contributions)q,(oldkey) 
Figure 5.2: Mass join 
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This protocol can be further optimized if the joining members together with the sponsor 
member formed a spanning tree among themselves, depicted in Figure 5.3, rather than a star 
topology. This would not only distribute the computations better, but is a more effective 
solution if not all joining members are within transmission range of the sponsor. However, 
at least one joining member must be within transmission range of the sponsor, and all 
joining members must form a connected graph. The optimized protocol is given in Figure 
5.4. 
Note that neither version of the mass join protocols require the formation of a spanning tree 





Figure 5.3: Mass addition of 5 new members in tree form 
Round 1 
l. Sponsor, s, agrees to add n new members to the group. 
2. s initiates the formation of a spanning tree of height h consisting entirely of 
new members with itself as the root. 
3. For all nodes v = y.i with Cv = 0 (the leaves of the tree): 
a. v selects a random kv E 
b. v ➔ y: ak, 
Rounds 2 ... h-1 
See IKA protocol, rounds 2 ... h 
Roundh 
l. s selects a random es E G 
k. 
2. s waits to receive a 1 for allj = l, .. ,c5 
3. s calculates contributions= (f)(K(c,)) from 
K(O) = es 
( 
k. )(/J(K(j-1)) 
K(j) = a 1 for j = I, ... ,cs 
4. for i in ( l..c5): 
s ➔ i: Mi. where 
M = (a(/J(oldkey) a(/J(K(i-1)) ak;+1 akc,) 
l , ' , ••• , 
5. s ➔ x: a(contributions) where x are all existing members 
Rounds h+l 
See IKA protocol, rounds h+l 
The resulting group key is: a{contributions )({J(oldkey) 




A merge occurs when an entire group joins another group to form a super-group. This is 
different than the mass join event, as the individuals joining have a pre-existing relationship 
with each other. 
One approach is to apply the mass join protocol given in section 5.1.2 to the smaller group. 
Another approach to group merge has been introduced in [BW98] then further discussed in 
[STWoo]. Under this approach, the two groups exchange their key residues: aK1 and aK1 , 
where K1 and K2 are the respective group keys. The super-group key now becomes aK1K1 • 
Not only is this method quick and simple, but it also allows for the super-group to rollback to 
the original two groups by switching they key back to either K1 or Kz. 
This approach may be extended to allow the merge of three or more groups. This can be 
done by designating one member of each group as group controller. The group controllers 
would then form the nodes of a spanning tree. The super-group key could then be formed by 
performing the AT-GDH initial key agreement using each node's own group key as their 
secret key. The final super-group key would then take the form: 
where K1, ... ,Kn are the individual group keys. One stipulation of this method is that each 
group controller must form a connected graph among themselves. 
5.2 Leave Protocols 
When a member leaves the group, it is desirable to form a new group key in order to exclude 
that individual from subsequent communications. It is assumed that upon the removal of 
that individual, all other nodes remain connected. 
According to the cliques protocol suite, this is done by simply changing the secret share of 
one of the remaining members, then broadcasting the set of all subkeys minus the newly 
excluded member's subkey. Thus the newly excluded member is unable to compute the new 
group key. 
Unfortunately, this procedure fails when applied to AT-GDH. The reason being the key 
structure of AT-GDH is vastly different than the key structure of the cliques protocol suite. 
AT-GDH key structure: aNn /\ (aNn-l /\ ... (aN3 /\ (aN1N2 ))) 
Cl. k N,N,N3···N 1ques ey structure: a - n 
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For example, suppose the root of the spanning tree took the following steps to come up with 
a new group key. First it would choose a new secret share, knew• Then it would compute the 
new group key as (aknew) 'P(oldkey)_ Finally it would disseminate aknew to all members 
throughout the spanning tree except the newly excluded member. However, if the newly 
excluded member was to eavesdrop on the communication, it could easily discern the value 
of aknew. Since this excluded member already knows the value of cp(old key), it can easily 
compute the new group key. Therefore, this is not a desirable method of choosing a new 
group key. 
In order for the excluded member not to be able to compute the new group key, that 
member's share must be removed from the key computation. This removal is fairly easy 
when the Cliques key structure is used, but much more complicated under the AT-GDH key 
structure. For example, referring to Figure 5.5, member 3 is to be excluded from the group. 
Assume for now that the spanning tree structure has not changed since the initial key 
exchange. Then the root node, member 1, chooses a new secret share, knew, and comes up 
with a new group key as follows: 
New group key= aN2 /\ (aN•kn,w) 
Where N2 = aN' /\ (aN6e2 ) and N4 = aN1e4 
Figure 5.5: Removal of member 3 
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This requires a re-calculation of the shares N 2 and N4• Unfortunately, the root node does not 
possess the knowledge required to calculate N2 and N4• Namely, it does not know N5, N6, N7, 
e2, or e4• Thus this information needs to be passed from the leaves upward to the root in a 
manner similar to phase 1 of the initial key agreement protocol. Finally, the key pieces can 
be passed downwards in the same way as phase 2 of the initial key agreement protocol. 
More realistically, it does not make sense to re-use the same key tree as was used for the 
initial key agreement due to the mobility of each individual member. For example, a 
member who was the direct child of the root node during the initial exchange may no longer 
be within immediate transmission range during the member exclusion operation. 
Additionally, the initiator of the initial key agreement, and the initiator of the member 
exclusion operation may not be the same node. Thus the root node may represent a 
different member in each case. 
Because of the need to form a new spanning tree combined with the need to perform both 
phase 1 and phase 2 of the initial key agreement, the member exclusion protocol becomes 
equivalent in efficiency to IKA. The only difference is that each node in the spanning tree 
(except the root node) does not have to select a new random secret share, they may reuse 
their original value. 
The mass exclusion operation faces the same problem as the single member exclusion 
operation, that is it is difficult to remove the excluded members' contributions from the 
group key. Thus, in order to prevent the excluded members from acquiring the new group 
key, a new spanning tree should be formed sans the excluded members. Then the IKA 
protocol can be performed on this new spanning tree to yield a new group key. 
Refreshing the key after a group division follows a similar pattern. To split a single group 
into n disjoint groups, one member from each group should be chosen to initiate the 
protocol. Each chosen initiator then forms a spanning tree consisting entirely of their own 
members, with themself as the root. The IKA protocol can then be performed on each 
spanning tree resulting in n new group keys. 
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5.3 Key Refresh 
The final auxiliary operation to be described is the key refresh. Depending on policy, the key 
may need refreshing for reasons other than a change in group membership. For example, 
keys can be set to expire after a certain length of time, forcing the key to be periodically 
refreshed. The group will also want to refresh the group key upon the disclosure of either 
the group key itself or a member's secret key. Because of the risk of a member's secret key 
being compromised, it makes sense to periodically refresh individual member's 
contributions as well as the group key. 
The actual protocol turns out to be even simpler than the single-member join case. The 
member whose contribution requires refreshing, i.e. its contribution is the oldest, initiates 
the protocol by generating a new secret key knew. This member then distributes its new 
• k ( k )rp(oldkey) contribution a .,w to all group members. The new group key becomes a new • Note 
that this new group key is independent from the previous group key. 
6 Analysis 
This chapter presents an analysis of the solution based on the design goals given in 
Chapter 3. 
6. 1 Security 
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Group Key Secrecy All of the protocols described in Chapter 5 are an extension of the 
two party Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Thus, the security of the protocols rest upon the 
intractability of the Diffie-Hellman problem. That is, given ak' modp and ak1 modp, it is 
infeasible to compute ak1k1 mod p. Since the mass join and exclusion protocols depend 
heavily upon the IKA protocol, they are at most as secure as the IKA. We leave it as an 
unproven conjecture that all of the protocols given in Chapter 5 can be reduced to the Diffie-
Hellman problem. 
Backward and Forward Secrecy We claim that excluded members cannot compute 
the new group key and newly admitted members cannot compute the previous group key. 
When a group member is excluded, the key structure is reconstructed in such a way that it 
does not include the excluded member's contributions. In addition, this new group key is 
never encrypted using a previous key. So the excluded member is prevented from 
discovering the new key. On the other hand, when a new member is admitted, they are given 
the value a(old key) mod p. Computing the old key from this value is equivalent to solving the 
discrete logarithm problem. 
Attack Resistance If the key agreement protocols are coupled with an authentication 
scheme, a non-member should not be able to fool participants by impersonation, altering 
messages, or by resending old messages. However, the protocols may be vulnerable to 
denial of service (DoS) attacks. If a parent node is not able to send messages, none of its 
children will be able to receive the key. 
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Freshness Since every method of updating the key given in Chapter s requires at least one 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange with a new or different contribution, this guarantees a fresh 
group key that has never been used before. 
6.2 Efficiency 
In this section, the complexity of each auxiliary protocol is described, and compared to the 
complexity of the initial key agreement. For a discussion of the efficiency of the initial key 
agreement, refer to [Hieo1]. The efficiency measures include the number of messages sent, 
the number of simple rounds, the number of synchronous rounds, the local computation, 
and the total computation. In a simple round, each node can only send and receive one 
message. But in a synchronous round, nodes can send and receive many messages. The 
local computation is defined as the maximum exponentiations each node is expected to 
compute. The total computation is then the sum of local computations over all nodes. 
Efficiency findings are summarized in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2. 
For the purpose of estimating efficiency measures, it is assumed that the spanning tree is k-
ary (each node has k children) and perfectly balanced. Let n represent the total number of 
nodes,j represent the number of joining nodes, and h represent the height of the tree. 
Table 6.1: Efficiency - messages and rounds 
Messages Simple Rounds Syn. Rounds 
IKA 2n-2 2k(logkn) 2logkn 
Join n k(logkn-1)-k + 2 logk(n-1) + 1 
Mass Join n + j-1 klogk(n - j) + 2klogkj log,j + 2log2kn 
Group Merge n k(logkn - 1) + 1 logkn 
Key Refresh n-1 k logkn -k logkn - 1 
Exclusion 2n-2 2k(logkn) 2logkn 
Table 6.2: Efficiency - computations 
Local exp. Total exp. 
IKA k(logkn) + 1 O(nlogkn) 
Join 2 n+l 
Mass Join k(logkj) + 1 n - j + O(jlogkj) 
Group Merge 2 n+2 
Key Refresh 2 n+l 
Exclusion k(logkn) + 1 O(nlogkn) 
6.2.1 Join 
Under the single-member join protocol, each node receives exactly one message. Thus the 
total number of messages is n. 
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It takes k simple rounds for a parent node to send messages to all of its children, and it takes 
2 simple rounds for the root to receive a message from the joining member and send a 
message to the joining member. So the total simple rounds are k(h - 1) + 2 = k(logkn-1) - k 
+ 2. However, it only takes one synchronous round for a parent to send messages to all of its 
children. So the total synchronous rounds are (h- 1) + 2 = logk(n-1) + 1. 
Each node performs one exponentiation, except the joining member who performs two. So 
the total computation is n + 1. 
6.2.2 Mass join 
Under the tree-based mass join protocol, all existing members except the root receive exactly 
one message. Each joining member sends one message to its parent, and receives one 
message from its parent. So the total messages are n - j - 1 + 2j = n - 1 + j. 
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In phase 1 of the protocol, each joining member sends contributions to their parent node. 
This takes khi simple rounds and hi synchronous rounds, where hi represents the height of 
the joining members' tree. In phase 2, key pieces are propagated to all joining members. At 
the same time, key pieces are propagated to existing members. So this takes khe + khi simple 
rounds and h synchronous rounds, where he is the height of the existing member's tree. 
Therefore, the total number of simple rounds is 2khi + khe = 2klogk}+ klo~(n - JJ and the 
total number of synchronous rounds is hi + h = log,J + logkn. 
Each existing member performs only one exponentiation. The number of exponentiations 
each joining member performs depends on the level, l, of the tree it is at (ie: the number of 
ancestors it has) and the number of right hand siblings it has, and the number of right hand 
siblings each of its ancestors have. Note that the leftmost node on the second to bottom level 
performs the most exponentiations. Since this stage of the protocol is almost exactly the 
same as the initial key agreement, the number of exponentiations each joining member 
performs is the same as the number of exponentiations performed during the initial key 
exchange. This number is: 
The worst case is kh + 1 = klog,J + 1. The total computations performed by existing members 
is n - j. The total computations performed by joining members is given by: 
6.2.3 Group merge 
In the group merge protocol, each node receives one message. So the number of messages 
sent is n. 
Assuming that only two groups are merging, let h1 and h2 be the heights of each group's trees 
respectively, and let hm = max{h1, h2}. Then, it takes one simple round for the roots of each 
tree to exchange messages, and k(hm - 1) additional simple rounds pass before the protocol 
terminates. This is a maximum of k(logkn - 1) + 1 simple rounds. Similarly, it takes logkn 
synchronous rounds. 
Every node except the roots performs one local exponentiation. Each root performs two 
exponentiations. This is a total of n + 2 exponentiations. 
6.2.4 Member exclusion 
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Since the member exclusion protocol involves performing an initial key agreement, the 
efficiency of the member exclusion protocol is identical to the initial key agreement protocol. 
The values are given in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2. 
6.2.5 Key refresh 
Undl':'r the key refresh protocol, every node except the root node receives one message, this is 
a total of n - 1 messages. There are k(h - 1) = k logkn - k simple rounds and h - 1 = logkn -
1synchronous rounds. Every node performs one exponentiation, excluding the root who 
performs two. The total exponentiations is n + 1. 
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7 Conclusion 
The constraining environment of mobile military networks poses challenges to the design of 
an efficient and secure group key exchange protocol. While many solutions to handle group 
key exchanges exist, very few were found to be suited for such a network. Among 
distributory key exchange protocols, most required the use of a central trusted authority, 
which is unpractical in an ad hoc setting. We overviewed one distributory protocol, 
optimized rekey, which does not rely on a central authority, thus rendering it as a possible 
solution. However, it requires global broadcasts, an inefficient method of communicating 
when nodes may be several hops away from the broadcaster. In addition, the protocol 
suffers from the disadvantages of distributory protocols, including the need for secure 
communication channels and the absence of a fresh key guarantee. 
Because of these disadvantages, we would prefer a contributory key agreement protocol. 
However, most existing contributory agreement protocols were found to be lacking. Some 
solutions made assumptions about the network topology, for example by requiring 
participants to form a ring as in Ingemarsson's protocol or a multi-dimensional cube in the 
Hypercube protocol. Other solutions, such as GDH.2, use a chained approach which is not 
as efficient as a tree-based approach. Yet even TGDH, while being an efficient tree-based 
protocol, still relied on global broadcasts. 
We found that the best existing solution to key agreement in a tactical setting was the AT-
GDH protocol. This protocol incorporated the efficiency of a tree structure without the need 
for global broadcasts and without making any assumptions about the network topology. The 
only problem was the AT-GDH protocol had not been fully specified. An algorithm existed 
for the initial key agreement, but no provisions were made for subsequent agreements which 
are needed when the group membership changes. 
To complete the AT-GDH key agreement, we presented several auxiliary agreement 
protocols. All of the protocols stemming from additions to the group membership were 
found to be considerably more efficient that the initial agreement protocol. The key refresh 
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algorithm was also found to be similarly more efficient than the initial agreement protocol. 
However, we were not able to construct a satisfactory algorithm to handle exclusions that 
would provide an advantage over the initial agreement. This was due to the inherent 
structure of the key which impedes the efficient removal of any one participant's 
contribution. Furthermore, each protocol is secure in that they are resistant to passive 
eavesdropping, preserve backward and forward secrecy, and guarantee a fresh session key. 
If coupled with an authentication scheme, the protocols also become resistant to active 
attacks. 
Possible future work may include modifying the initial agreement algorithm to produce a 
different key structure, thus allowing a more efficient member exclusion protocol. Another 
problem with the current protocol is no provisions are made to determine the shape of the 
spanning tree. For example, some nodes may have 100+ children, other nodes may have 
only two. Optimizing the shape of the tree would then optimize the protocol's efficiency. 
Since nodes on the left-hand side of the tree perform more computations than nodes on the 
right-hand side, even a perfectly balanced tree may not be computationally optimal. 
A better solution to group key agreement in the tactical network may be found by exploring 
the use of a protocol other than Diffie-Hellman as the building block. Perhaps such a 
solution may be more efficient in general, handle member exclusions better, or provide a 
workaround to the bijection cp problem. 
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